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Unity in Crisis: Protometaphysical and Postmetaphysical Decisions 
 
 
The metaphysics of unity: its end and its onset 
The notion of an end of metaphysics dominated twentieth-century 
philosophy. The roots of the theme trace back to Hume’s skeptical attack 
on the metaphysics of substance and Kant’s subsequent critical attempt to 
redeem the metaphysical mode of knowledge—the synthetic a priori—in the 
form of a de-absolutized transcendental philosophy. The sense of an 
imminent end of metaphysical modes of thought—the demise of traditional 
“cosmological values” such as aim, unity, and being/truth—becomes 
explicit in Nietzsche’s declaration that “[. . .] any comprehensive unity in 
the plurality of events is lacking [. . .] the categories ‘aim,’ ‘unity,’ ‘being’ 
which we used to insert some value into the world—we pull out again [. . .]”1 
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In the wake of Nietzsche, both Carnap and Heidegger—logical 
positivism as well as hermeneutics and deconstruction, “analytic” as well as 
“continental” philosophy—declared the end of metaphysics. For Carnap, 
this signified the acknowledgment of the meaninglessness of metaphysical 
(non-empirical and non-analytic) statements and the subsequent 
integration of philosophy into empirical science as a technique of logical 
analysis.2 For Heidegger, the end of metaphysics meant the Hegelian 
completion and Nietzschean inversion of Platonic-Aristotelian ontological 
foundationalism (“ontotheology”). The outcome of the demise of 
metaphysics demise is the ultramodern age of fulfilled techno-scientific 
nihilism in which beings are determined by a technical framework or 
“setup” (Gestell) as an inherently meaningless and homogeneous “standing 
reserve” (Bestand) of material resources, and the human being accordingly 
becomes a “human resource,” an “employee” of an impersonal and 
subjectless “ordering” or “disposing” (Angestellte des Bestellens).3 
 The thesis of an end of metaphysics involved the diagnosis of a 
beginning of metaphysics, which both Nietzsche and the later Heidegger 
locate in Plato. Heidegger, however, extends Nietzsche’s genealogy of 
Platonism to what can be characterized as the protometaphysical approach 
of the pre-Platonic thinkers. It is here that Heidegger discovers what he 
designates as the “first beginning” (der erste Anfang)—in a determinate, 
idiosyncratic sense of the word Anfang, distinguished from a beginning 
(Beginn) in the sense of a chronological start—of metaphysical thinking. 
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With regard to Nietzsche’s description of Platonism as a “disease”4 and to 
the Heideggerian idiom of “getting over” (Verwindung) metaphysics,5 it is 
perhaps appropriate to translate Anfang as “onset,” in a sense analogous to 
an “onset of illness.” In his 1942–3 lecture course Parmenides, Heidegger 
notes: 
  
With regard to this early thinking in the Occident, among the Greeks, 
we distinguish between beginning [Beginn] and onset [Anfang]. 
“Beginning” refers to the coming forth of this thinking at a definite 
“time.” [. . .] The “onset” is what, in this early thinking, is to be 
thought and what is thought. [. . .] The onset is not something 
dependent on the favor of these thinkers, something with which they 
deal in such and such a way. On the contrary, [. . .] [t]he thinkers are 
the ones who are set upon [An-gefangenen] by the on-set [An-fang], 
overtaken by it and gathered upon it.6 
 
The onset of philosophy, for Heidegger, is neither a starting point left 
behind in the later development of philosophy nor the inaugural act of 
beginning to philosophize, but rather the motive and the task faced by the 
first philosophers. An onset is literally what “sets on” or “sets about” (fängt 
an), in the sense of addressing or capturing one’s attention. It is not an 
accomplishment of the early philosophers, but rather the initial 
philosophical issue that preoccupies them, a fundamental experience that 
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“sets upon” thinkers and addresses them at the beginning of philosophy, 
thereby “bringing about” their thinking. Anfang can thus be understood as 
a rendering of the Greek archē. The Greek verb archō, archein means “to 
begin” and “to initiate” as well as “to govern,” “to preside over,” and “to 
rule.” Archē, Anfang, is the onset or outset that is precisely not left behind 
in the ensuing development, but rather governs and directs the unfolding of 
whatever issues from it. For Aristotle, the archē, the guiding principle of a 
thing, is also its peras, its limit, as well as its telos, its end and conclusion.7 
Likewise, what Heidegger means by the Anfang of philosophy is a guiding 
“mission” or leading “quest” of Western metaphysics, a principle that 
delimits and defines, governs and directs, and thereby unifies the 
metaphysical tradition, marking the boundary within which it takes place. 
The onset delineates and determines, so to speak, the scene upon which 
the different episodes of Western philosophy are enacted: while the 
respective settings of the different epochs vary, the scene as such remains 
the same. In this sense, the Heideggerian Anfang is in many ways parallel 
to Badiou’s event, the singular temporal rupture that institutes the 
possibility of a new “fidelity,” of a new process of delimiting a new truth in 
terms of the historical event.8  
In this sense, the onset of philosophy is also a crisis, a krisis in the 
literal Greek sense of the word: a de-cision or dis-tinction (Ent-scheidung), a 
de-limitation or dis-crimination of the proper domain of Western thought.  
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By “onset” we understand the original decisions [Entscheidungen] 
that sustain in advance what is essential in Western history. [. . .] 
The recollection of the onset of our history is the awakening of 
knowing about the decision that, even now, and in the future, 
determines Western humanity.9 
 
These initial decisions—the protometaphysical crisis—are situated by 
Heidegger in the work of three pre-Platonic thinkers: Anaximander of 
Miletus, Heraclitus of Ephesus, and Parmenides of Elea.  
 
Anaximander, Parmenides and Heraclitus are the thinkers of the 
onset [die anfänglichen Denker]. They are this, however, not because 
they inaugurate Western thought and initiate it. Already before them 
there “are” thinkers. They are thinkers of the onset because they 
think the onset. The onset is what is thought in their thinking.10 
 
What makes precisely these three protometaphysical philosophers the 
thinkers of the first onset? In Heidegger’s reading, they are all, first and 
foremost, thinkers of an ultimate unity. The “necessity,” “need,” or “usage” 
(Brauch, to chreōn) that, in the single preserved Anaximander fragment, 
governs the emergence and disappearance of beings11; the “fate” or 
“apportioning” (Moira) that preserves the self-identity and self-sufficiency of 
being in Parmenides12; the discursive articulation (logos) that constitutes 
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the fundamental belonging-together of opposites and differences in 
Heraclitus13—all these are, for Heidegger, names for a fundamental unity of 
being as presence.  
 
[. . .] the essence of being [Seins] is determined as the essence of the 
unifying One: Hen. [. . .] the Logos which Heraclitus thinks as the 
basic feature of presencing [Anwesens], the Moira which Parmenides 
thinks as the basic feature of presencing, the Chreōn which 
Anaximander thinks as what abides [das Wesende] in presencing, all 
name the selfsame [das Selbe]. Each thinker thinks, in his own way, 
the unity of the unifying One, the Hen, in the concealed richness of 
the selfsame.14  
 
Of the three, Parmenides was in many ways the most important for 
Heidegger. After completing his influential conversation with Aristotle in the 
early 1930s, it was first and foremost to Parmenides that Heidegger turned 
and kept returning until his last seminar in 1973.15 In regarding 
Parmenides as a paradigmatic beginner of metaphysics, Heidegger follows 
the guidance of Aristotle and Hegel. In De caelo, Aristotle indicates that in 
addition to the philosophical beginning usually attributed to Thales of 
Miletus, there was also another beginning, namely, the thesis of 
Parmenides and his Eleatic disciples that being is one, ungenerated, and 
immutable. For Aristotle, this is the first, albeit inarticulate and confused, 
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step towards discovering the proper realm of what he himself calls first 
philosophy and what later becomes known as metaphysics: the 
nonphysical, nonmaterial, and suprasensible sphere of pure intelligibility 
that necessarily unifies and grounds all intelligible reality.16 Hegel echoes 
Aristotle in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy:  
 
[The Eleatics] arrive at this pure, abstract thought that being belongs 
only to the One. This is a tremendous advance. With the Eleatic 
school, thought, properly speaking, begins to be free for the first time 
on its own account [. . .].17 
 
Thought is identical with its being, for there is nothing beside being, 
this great affirmation. [. . .] Since in this an advance into the region of 
the ideal is observable, Parmenides began philosophy proper. [. . .] 
This beginning [Anfang] is certainly still dim and indefinite, and we 
cannot say much of what it involves; but to take up this position 
certainly is to develop philosophy proper, which has not hitherto 
existed.18 
 
As we will see, the beginning of Western metaphysics is characterized by a 
powerful discourse of unity, on the one hand, and by a profound crisis, on 
the other—a crisis in the literal sense of a sharp distinction, disjunction, or 
decision. Both of these features are expressed in the Poem of Parmenides, a 
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central textual site of the first onset of the metaphysical tradition. A 
reconsideration and reenactment of this original crisis lies at the heart of 
the later Heidegger’s philosophical endeavor and his thesis of the end of 
metaphysics. By contrasting Parmenides’ protometaphysical situation with 
the Heideggerian postmetaphysical situation, it is possible to trace a 
genealogy of sorts of certain themes operative in this end. Moreover, it 
thereby becomes possible to see an analogy between the initial crisis of 
Parmenides and the ongoing “postmodern” philosophical crisis: both are 
essentially crises of unity.  
 
The protometaphysical crisis: Parmenides’ decision  
Parmenides of Elea, of whom we know next to nothing as a person, lived 
and worked in the Greek colonies of Southern Italy around 500 BCE. His 
hexametric poem, known by the name Peri physeōs (“On Nature”), is one of 
the earliest extensive, consistent, and sustained philosophical texts of 
which parts have come down to us.19 No version of the entire poem has 
been preserved, but several of its passages—apparently many of the most 
important ones—have been transmitted by later authors in the form of 
quotations.  
 Parmenides’ Poem as we know it does not really constitute a 
systematic theoretical account. It is perhaps best characterized as a 
phenomenological indication of an initial philosophical experience of being 
as such (to eon) as the absolute foundation of all thinking, apart from 
 9 
particular and determinate present things—as pure intelligibility, as 
accessibility to awareness or, to use Heidegger’s term, as active presencing, 
abiding in presence (Anwesen). To be more precise, the Poem shows how in 
every possible intentional awareness of anything, intelligibility itself is co-
intended. The distinctive feature of Parmenidean “phenomenology” is this 
exclusive concentration on phenomenality as such, apart from any 
particular phenomena. Speaking literally, instead of phainomena, that 
which shows itself, Parmenides focuses on their phainesthai, their self-
showing in the widest possible sense. The topic of his Poem is alētheia, 
“truth,” but to translate this word with the etymologizing Heideggerian 
“unconcealment” (Unverborgenheit) involves an un-Parmenidean reference 
to a prior concealment. For Parmenides, as Ernst Heitsch notes, truth as 
alētheia rather means phenomenal and intuitive evidence as the ultimate 
level of manifestness in beings—the source of all their “acceptability” and 
“convincing” power as accessible beings.20  
Parmenides’ Poem begins with a metaphorical “transcendental 
reduction.”21 The introduction or Proem of the text (fragment B 1) is a semi-
mythical narrative in which the narrator-thinker leaves behind the “trodden 
path of mortals” in a chariot drawn by divine horses and enters the domain 
of an anonymous goddess, “beyond the gate of the roads of Night and Day,” 
i.e., beyond the binary oppositions that constitute the relative, articulated 
reality of ordinary experience.22 Far from being angered by this 
transgression, the goddess welcomes him and proceeds to indicate to him 
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the absolute truth about all things, exposing the thinker’s task in the 
following manner: 
 
It is necessary that you learn all things, 
the unwavering heart of fully convincing Evidence [Alētheia],  
as well as the acceptances [doxai] of mortals, in which there is no 
evident conviction [pistis alēthēs]. 
Even so, you will come to understand this: how the things that are 
accepted [ta dokounta] 
had to be there acceptably [dokimōs einai], throughout, all of them 
precisely as beings [panta per onta].23  
 
To continue borrowing Husserlian terminology, the “path of mortals” can be 
understood as designating the “natural attitude” in which finite human 
beings normally live their ordinary practical lives, dealing with particular, 
individual things in particular practical situations. The attainment of a 
purely “philosophical attitude,” i.e., of a concentration on pure presence as 
such apart from its particular determinations and instances, requires an 
initial break with everyday and common sense perceptions, an epochē, as 
well as a transition to a “transcendental” (in the sense of “absolutely 
universal”) point of view. However, contrary to a reading favored by such 
classical commentators as Nietzsche, Eduard Zeller, and John Burnet, 
such a break clearly does not mean that the everyday views (doxai) of the 
 11 
mortals should simply be abandoned or eliminated as false or illusive 
opinions or semblances.24 The goddess rather emphasizes that they are to 
be reconsidered and reinterpreted in terms of an absolute viewpoint. The 
word doxa, related to the verb dechomai, “to accept” or “to receive,” literally 
means “acceptance,” i.e., the way in which something offers itself and 
seems to be, as well as the way in which it is accepted or “taken” to be.25 
The doxai are that which, in the “natural attitude,” is accepted as “being”; 
they constitute the relative “mortal” reality or realities. The goddess’s 
exhortation to the thinker is that this accepted constitution must be 
understood in terms of an insight into the absolutely universal aspect of 
reality, into being-there in the sense of presence, accessibility, or 
acceptability—into the “there is” or givenness inherent in, and presupposed 
by, every acceptance of some particular thing as “being there.” This is the 
basic premise of the “phenomenological” reading of Parmenides, introduced 
in modern times by scholars like Karl Reinhardt and Hans Schwabl.26 
However, certain essential differences between Parmenidean 
“phenomenology” and modern phenomenological approaches should not be 
overlooked. Like Husserl, Parmenides sets outs from the intentional nature 
of awareness, but whereas modern transcendental phenomenology makes 
the reflective move from constituted objects toward the (inter)subjective 
structures of their constitution as correlates of an intentional, intending 
consciousness, Parmenides’ Poem puts the weight on the “intendability” of 
things, their givenness as intelligible to the primarily receptive human 
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awareness. In Kant’s doctrine of transcendental apperception, every 
possible awareness of an object is potentially accompanied by a reflective 
awareness of the “I think,” i.e., of a subject of awareness; the unifying 
element in all individual acts of awareness is the transcendental I or self, 
the subject of the act.27 Parmenides’ Poem, by contrast, shows that every 
possible awareness of a determinate being is potentially accompanied by an 
awareness of the very accessibility of beings to awareness. It is intelligibility 
as such that is “transcendental” in the sense of transcending all particular 
determinations or instances of presence. 
What is distinctive of mortal reality is that it consists of particular 
things that both are and are not, in the existential as well as the predicative 
senses of “to be.” Firstly, depending on the situation, determinate things 
either are there or not. For example, right here and at this moment, there is 
a cup in my hand, but there is no coffee in the cup. Moreover, all the things 
that are or are not there have a merely relative self-identity. The cup in my 
hand is itself, i.e., is identical with itself, but it is not coffee, it is other than 
coffee. In the “natural attitude” of the mortals, human beings therefore live 
in what Parmenides’ goddess calls, literally, an “uncritical” (akrita) state, 
more precisely, in a “lack of crisis,” a “lack of decision.” There is a constant 
internal tension between relative being-there and relative not-being-there, 
relative identity and relative non-identity. This makes the mortals 
 
[. . .] an undecided [akrita] tribe, 
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for whom being-there and not-being-there are established as the 
same 
and not-same. For all of them, their path is internally tensional 
[palintropos].28 
 
How is this indecision, this tension between being-there and not-being-
there, i.e., between presence and absence, to be resolved? Here lies 
Parmenides’ fundamental discovery. For the pure and simple apprehending 
of intelligibility as such that inherently belongs to all specific acts of 
awareness—perceiving, imagining, remembering, or anticipating 
something—there is only presence in the widest possible sense. “There is no 
coffee in my cup” means that coffee is not present here and now for my 
senses. However, in order for me to be able to meaningfully express this 
absence of coffee and to attribute not-being-there to coffee, I must be 
talking about coffee. In other words, I must refer to coffee, mean coffee, 
intend coffee. Coffee must, in some sense, be “there” for me, present to my 
awareness, although not in its full or “bodily” presence but in a deficient, 
only partially fulfilled or empty mode. Yet even the mere symbolic intending 
of coffee, mere talk about “coffee” with a minimum of intuitive content, 
remains a mode of the presence of coffee. Everything that can be 
meaningfully intended is intendable or rather intelligible, and in this sense 
it is present and accessible to thinking (noos), which, for Parmenides, 
means simply intentional awareness in the widest possible sense, intending 
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or “meaning” anything in any way.29 It is essential to see that nothing can 
be intended as completely unintelligible. Even self-contradicting notions 
like “round square” are simply impossible combinations of elements (such 
as roundness and squareness) that are perfectly intelligible in themselves. 
While the embodied and situated senses encounter things as relatively 
present or absent, as given to the senses or not given, noos in the sense of 
meaningful intending encounters only pure and absolute presence. This is 
the main outcome of fragment B 4: 
 
Behold, all alike, absent things [apeonta] as firmly present [pareonta] 
to awareness [noos]; 
for awareness will not cut off the “is there” [to eon] from its 
consistency with the “is there,” 
neither as being distributed everywhere and in every way along a 
universal order [kosmos] 
nor as being combined.30 
 
When we enter the absolute realm of thinking, the internally differing and 
tensional path of the mortals—the way of “there is and there is not”—thus 
breaks apart, resulting in a fundamental crisis, a need for decision. From 
the perspective of situated sensory perceiving, relative presence and relative 
absence intertwine inseparably and presuppose one another. However, 
since intelligibility as presence-to-thinking is a simple and absolute form of 
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presence, a thinking inquiry will not tolerate internal tension or context-
specificity. It rather requires the thinker to choose one of two absolute 
alternatives: either the absolute “there is” (absolute presence, absolute 
intelligibility) or the absolute “there is not” (absolute non-presence, 
absolute non-intelligibility). These are the famous “two ways” of 
Parmenides. 
 
Very well, I will tell you—and do you listen to the account and take 
good heed— 
which ways of inquiry are precisely the only ones that can be grasped 
by awareness [noēsai]. 
Firstly: how there is [estin] and how there is no lack of being-there 
[mē einai]— 
this is the path of Conviction [Peithō], for it follows Evidence 
[Alētheia]. 
Secondly: how, in any event, there is not [ouk estin ge] and how it is 
necessary that a lack of being-there is there— 
this I explicate to you as being a path entirely devoid of conviction 
[panapeithea]. 
For you will not come to know that which in any event lacks “is 
there” [to ge mē eon]—for it is not accessible [ephikton]— 
nor will you explicate it.31 
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Awareness as such is simply reception or acceptance of intelligible 
presence, and being-there is simply the givenness and disclosure of 
intelligible presence to awareness. Therefore, awareness and being-there 
coincide. They are “one and the same” in that they are two aspects—
receptivity and givenness—of intelligibility as a unified whole. This is what 
Parmenides’ famous and much-disputed fragment B 3, which has been 
preserved without context, seems to state: 
 
For being-aware and being-there are one and the same [to gar auto 
noein estin te kai einai].32 
 
Inversely, the opposite or outside of being-there—not-being-there, 
nothingness, non-presence, non-accessibility—coincides with the opposite 
or outside of awareness. Awareness is defined by being exclusively bound to 
presence and excluded from non-presence.  
 
It is necessary to articulate this and to grasp this [to legein, to noein 
te]: that the “is there” is there [eon emmenai]. For there is being-there 
[esti gar einai], 
and there is no Nothing [mēden].33 
 
It is obvious that no active “decision,” in the sense of a free choice between 
two options, is involved here. The outcome of the Parmenidean decision has 
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always already been decided; the point is to acknowledge it. Thinking is 
powerless to do anything other than choose absolute presence and 
absolutely exclude absolute non-presence. Thinking, i.e., the intentional 
awareness of reality as meaningful and intelligible, and its rational 
articulation, can have no dealings with absolute unintelligibility. The way of 
“there is not” is a purely negative possibility, the negation of “there is.” The 
only function of this absolute “there is not” is to define the domain of 
thinking, to demarcate the absolute boundary of thought, precisely by 
being excluded by thinking. This, precisely, is Parmenides’ crisis. 
 
The decision [krisis] regarding these matters is this: 
either there is [estin] or there is not [ouk estin]. Now, it has already 
been decided [kekritai], as is necessary,  
that the other is to be left alone as unintelligible [anoēton] and 
nameless—for it is not there as an evident 
way—and that the other is to prevail and to be there as genuine.34 
 
The crisis between “there is” and “there is not,” between presence and 
unpresence, has always already been resolved. It is a movement of 
exclusion that must be completed in order to leave behind the path of 
mortals, the way of “there both is and is not,” and to embark on the way of 
thinking, that is, the way of “there is,” the way of absolute presence. 
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For at no time will you impose this: that things lacking “is there” [mē 
eonta] are there; 
no, do divert your awareness [noēma] from this way of inquiry. 
[…] Rather, decide, through discursive articulation [krinai logō], the 
controversial refutation [elenchon] 
that I have articulated. Only one account of a way still 
remains: how There is [hōs estin].35  
 
From here, Parmenides’ Poem goes on to unfold absolute presence through 
a series of signs or indications (sēmata). This happens in the long fragment 
B 8, in which the most important section of the first part of the Poem, 
known as “Truth” or “Evidence” (Alētheia), has apparently been entirely 
preserved. The indications are “signposts” on the way of “there is.” They do 
not constitute a deductive or hierarchical system, but rather point out 
different perspectives upon a presence that has now been absolutely cut off 
from anything other than presence. Presence as such is absolutely identical 
with itself and absolutely devoid of any internal or external differentiation. 
Presence is not opposed to or differentiated from any other. Presence or 
being is not even different from non-presence or non-being, since a 
difference between them would already imply a relationship. Moreover, 
presence has no internal distinctions. It is absolutely simple and one-
dimensional; the temporal and spatial differences between context-specific 
situated beings do not apply to being as such. Presence is finished, self-
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sufficient, self-contained, self-coincident, homogeneous, one-dimensional, 
and unique. In a Heideggerian reading, all of these indications are gathered 
together by the indication of being-there as constant temporal presence that 
as such is never specific to a particular point of time, but rather constitutes 
the very now-ness of every singular now: 
 
At no particular time [pot’] there was [ēn] or there will be [estai], since 
there is now [nyn estin], all at once, 
unitarily-uniquely [hen], constantly [syneches].36 
 
This is the only time that the word hen, “one,” appears in the Parmenides 
fragments.37 Nevertheless, unity has always been perceived as the key 
theme of Parmenides’ Poem. Both Plato and Aristotle considered 
Parmenides’ fundamental doctrine to be precisely the thesis that being (to 
on) is one (hen). In his late dialogue named after the Eleatic master, Plato 
has Parmenides visit Athens with his associate Zeno and reluctantly teach 
the art of dialectic—i.e., the discursive method of accessing the ultimate 
unity of discursive meaning—to the Athenians. In spite of his young age, 
the Socrates of the Parmenides is well aware of Parmenides’ fundamental 
doctrine: “I understand, Parmenides […]. In your poetry you maintain that 
the All [to pan] is one [hen], providing tokens of this appropriately and well 
[…]”38 And indeed, Parmenides’ masterful dialectical “exercise” in the 
dialogue is entirely about unity and being. It seems that the question that 
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puzzles Plato in the Parmenides, as also in the Sophist, is precisely how 
Parmenides’ teaching concerning the unity of being should be understood. 
Aristotle echoes Plato: “Deeming that that which lacks being [to mē on] is 
nothing besides being [to on], he [sc. Parmenides] believes that, by 
necessity, there is only the one [hen] being and nothing other.”39  
 In the Poem, the indications of the absolute unity of pure presence 
are followed by a return to the doxai, the mortal “acceptances.” The second 
main part of the Poem, known as Doxai, apparently consisted of an 
extensive cosmological study of physical reality, of which only a few brief 
fragments remain. However, from the existing material we can infer that 
Parmenides’ goddess shows here how the discursive structure of ordinary 
human awareness takes apart the unity of presence by naming, 
conceptualizing, and thereby distinguishing (krinein) beings from one 
another, organizing reality into binary oppositions such as light-dark, 
warm-cold, and male-female. Doxai is introduced at the end of fragment B 8 
in the following way:  
 
With this, I cease the convincing articulation [logos] and awareness 
[noēma] that I addressed to you 
regarding evidence [alētheia]. From here, come to understand mortal 
acceptances [doxai], 
hearing the universal order [kosmos], prone to deception, that 
emerges from my words. 
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 For they [sc. the mortals] established two notions [gnōmai] to 
name shapes [morphai]; 
of these, one cannot be [sc. established without the other]—in this, 
they are led into error. 
They differentiated [krinein] the structure into opposites and posited 
indications [sēmata] 
apart from one another [. . .].40 
 
By now, however, the thinker has learned that, in spite of appearances, 
none of these differentiations involves a reference to any absolute difference 
between “there is” and “there is not.” All oppositional and disjunctive 
predicates according to which a thing is A but is not B are ultimately just 
determinate modifications of the pure and simple there is. For example, 
from the mortal perspective, there is darkness and there is light, and 
darkness is not light: but the negative fact that darkness is not there as 
light can be translated into the positive fact that darkness is there as not-
light. 
 
But now that all things are named “light” and “night” 
and these names, according to their respective capacities [dynameis], 
are given to one thing after another, 
everything is at once full of light and invisible night, 
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equal to one another, for there is nothing [mēden] that belongs to 
neither side.41 
  
With the Poem of Parmenides, the initial crisis of Western thought has been 
resolved through the protometaphysical de-cision, i.e., the separation of 
presence from all references to any other-than-presence, and through the 
indication of the absolutely universal character of pure presence as the 
proper realm of philosophical thought. The metaphysical project properly 
introduced by Plato and Aristotle subsequently transforms this 
protometaphysical onset into the full-fledged metaphysics of presence, into 
what Heidegger calls the “ontotheology” of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. 
Aristotle’s study of being qua being starts by acknowledging the 
“transcendental” character of being. Being—like unity—is “transcendental” 
in the Scholastic sense of “absolutely universal”: it transcends all categories 
of things but cannot itself be a category, kind, or genus, since Aristotle’s 
theory of definition denies the plausibility of a genus that would 
comprehend everything.42 In different contexts, “to be” has different senses 
that are irreducible to any simple overarching notion.43 There is no 
common denominator, no principle or structure common to all instances of 
“to be.”44 Nevertheless, everything that is said “to be” does share the 
structural feature of belonging to a hierarchy of being-more and being-less: 
to be something potentially is to be that thing less than to be it actually45; 
to be an attribute of a determinate entity is an inferior sense of being in 
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comparison to being that entity itself, and so on. Ultimately, all beings refer 
to the top of this hierarchy of being, to a “standard” sense of “to be”—ousia, 
“Entity,” the being-ness of determinate, particular, and actual entities (as 
opposed to attributes of entities, or merely potential entities and 
attributes)46 and in the final instance, to a supreme entity, which for 
Aristotle is God (theos) as absolutely self-sufficient self-awareness.47 
Ontology, the study of being qua being, thereby assumes the form of 
theology, the study of a supreme being, of an absolute entity that would 
maximally fulfill the criteria of absolute presence (simplicity, uniqueness, 
self-sufficiency, permanence, supratemporality, etc.) and thus function as a 
standard for all inferior entities. The unity of being is no longer guaranteed 
simply by pure presence as such, but by the supreme instance of presence. 
 
The postmetaphysical crisis: Heidegger’s decision 
After Parmenides, the initial crisis of presence and non-presence recedes as 
a crisis. Leibniz’s question: “Why is there something rather than 
nothing?”48—in other words, “Why is there intelligible presence rather than 
not?”—is only a faint reverberation. Parmenides’ crisis is left behind, but its 
outcome continues to serve as an outset of Western metaphysics. In a 
Heideggerian formulation, the “basic question” (Grundfrage) of 
metaphysics—“Why are there beings at all, rather than nothing?”—is 
supplanted by Aristotle’s ontological “leading question” (Leitfrage)—“what is 
being qua being, what is the beingness of any being whatsoever?”—which 
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subsequently becomes the ontotheological question, “What is the supreme 
instance of beingness that provides an ideal model for all beings?”49 
 Ontotheology, Heidegger claims, provides the basic framework of 
Western metaphysics up to Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche, with whom the 
metaphysical tradition becomes complete in the sense of being completely 
developed and exhausted; Marx’s “overturning” of Hegelian idealism and 
Nietzsche’s “overturning” of Platonism are simply the final metaphysical 
moves before exhaustion.50 Nietzsche’s notions of the will to power and of 
the eternal recurrence of the same are the last unused conceptual 
resources available for thinking the relationship between the human being 
and being within the scope of metaphysics.51 This exhaustion of 
metaphysics is parallel to the rise of the positive techno-science, which 
renounces the metaphysical quest for absolute foundations and 
concentrates on producing causally explanatory theories with maximal 
predictive power from which technological applications ensue. Francis 
Bacon’s maxim, “knowledge is power,” captures what Heidegger calls the 
“cybernetic,” i.e., inherently technical and manipulative, character of 
modern scientific inquiry.52  
 In his work of the 1930s, Heidegger accordingly comes to envision an 
other beginning, made possible and topical by the end of metaphysics—an 
“other onset” of thinking (der andere Anfang) which, he maintains, 
contemporary Western thought is currently entering.  
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With Nietzsche’s metaphysics, philosophy is completed. That means: 
it has traversed the sphere of prefigured possibilities. […] But with 
the end of philosophy, thinking is not also at its end, but in transition 
[Übergang] to another onset.53 
 
Unlike Badiou’s purely contingent event, which constitutes a rupture with 
what precedes it54, this new onset, which demands a new philosophical 
“fidelity,” retains a certain continuity with the first one: it is “other” 
precisely to the Parmenidean onset, in the sense of decisively transgressing 
its boundaries, yet essentially related to it. It therefore becomes accessible 
only by way of a thorough reexamination of the first onset and of the 
metaphysical tradition that emerged from it.  
 
We need to reflect here on the onset of Western thinking and on what 
occurred in it and did not occur in it, because we stand at the end—
at the end of this onset. That is, we are standing before the decision 
[Entscheidung] between the end [. . .] and the other onset [dem 
anderen Anfang] [. . .].55  
 
The required postmetaphysical reflection on the first onset of Western 
thinking is characterized by Heidegger as a decision (Entscheidung)—i.e., as 
a crisis, a critical reconsideration and “retrieval” (Wiederholung) of the first 
onset that would make its limitations visible and thus allow a 
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discrimination and delimitation of a mode of thinking that would go beyond 
those limitations. This also illuminates the methodological character of his 
thesis of the end of metaphysics. It is not a prophetical declaration that 
there can and will be no more metaphysics in the future. Rather, it is a 
specific way of drawing the limits of the heritage of the first onset from the 
perspective of the contemporary situation—a historical decision. 
 
Might not the future still be open to metaphysical possibilities of 
which we suspect nothing? Surely, we do not stand “above” history 
[…]. The statement concerning the end of metaphysics is, of course, a 
historical decision [Entscheidung].56 
 
This postmetaphysical decision, this crisis between the Parmenidean onset 
and its other, is a theme that ceaselessly occupies Heidegger in his work of 
the 1930s, particularly his esoteric “second magnum opus,” Contributions to 
Philosophy, written in 1936–8 but unpublished until 1989. In the first part 
of Contributions, Heidegger names several decisions (Entscheidungen) that 
philosophy has to face in its contemporary situation: whether the human 
being is to be considered as a subject (as in modern, post-Cartesian 
metaphysics) or as Da-sein (as in Heidegger); whether truth is to be 
understood as correctness and certainty (as in modern, post-Cartesian 
metaphysics) or as un-concealment, relative dis-closure (as in Heidegger); 
and so on.57 What is ultimately at stake in these decisions is the basic 
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decision between metaphysical (Cartesian, Kantian, Hegelian, Nietzschean) 
modernity and a post-metaphysical post-modernity, in the literal sense of 
what comes after the modern epoch but is other than modernity.  
 
Why must decisions be made at all? If so, then they are necessities 
that belong to our epoch […]. What is decision here? Its essence is 
determined by the essence of the transition [Übergang] from 
modernity into what is other than modernity. […] Do the “decisions” 
come about because there must be another onset?58 
 
In the other onset, the initial crisis that was settled by Parmenides is 
reopened, but not in order to simply reverse Parmenides’ decision, not just 
to decide for non-presence rather than presence, for the nothing rather 
than the something. What is essential is to rethink and re-experience this 
crisis as such, to decide for a crisis instead of the uncritical indifference 
and universal equivalence that, in Heidegger’s analysis, characterizes the 
ultramodern nihilistic perception of reality as inherently homogeneous and 
meaningless.  
 
What is originally at stake in the decision is: either decision or non-
decision. But decision means coming face to face with the either–or. 
Thus it means that a decision has already been made […].59 
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The one and only decision is the decision between […] indecision and 
readiness for decision.60 
 
In the contemporary situation, reexperiencing Parmenides’ initial crisis 
would, of course, be an essentially different experience. It would be an 
essentially retrospective reconsideration, informed by a narrative of the 
history of metaphysics in which Parmenides is only the primordial outset: 
“[. . .] returning into the first onset is [. . .] precisely distancing from it, 
taking up that distant position which is necessary in order to experience 
what set on in and as that onset.”61 As Heidegger puts it in one of his last 
seminars, the point is not to “return to Parmenides” but simply to “turn 
towards Parmenides” from out of the contemporary situation.62 What would 
be essential in such a retrospective reconsideration would be the discovery 
that the entire Western tradition relies, to a certain extent, on an initial de-
cision and exclusion of non-presence. It has therefore always implicitly 
dependent on, in the sense of being defined and delimited by, non-
presence.  
 
Only because be-ing [Seyn, i.e., the postmetaphysically reconsidered 
and “expanded” being] abides in terms of the “not” [nichthaft] does it 
have non-being [Nichtsein] as its other. [. . .] But whence comes the 
utmost confinement [sc. in the first onset] to the One and the Other 
and thus to the Either-Or [sc. either being or non-being]? [. . .] this 
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seemingly most general and emptiest distinction [Unterscheidung] is 
the most unique and fullest decision [Entscheidung].63  
 
This discovery, which results from the reawakening of the initial crisis of 
presence in the contemporary situation, is what Heidegger basically means 
by the other onset of post-metaphysical thinking. In the other onset, the 
traditional metaphysical indifference to the nothing and the reduction of 
reality to absolute presence is transformed into the experience that 
meaningful presence as such is based on its differing from non-presence, 
un-intelligibility, and un-accessibility: “[. . .] be-ing [Seyn] abides [west] 
thoroughly irradiated [durchstrahlt] by the nothing [Nichts].”64 
 The postmetaphysical experience of the fundamentally relative, 
differential, and self-transcending structure of meaningful presence, of its 
dependency on and correlation with its other, from which it is constantly 
differentiated—this is the “crisis” that is to replace the reliance on the 
fundamental absoluteness, unity, and self-referentiality of presence. One 
way of describing this experience is as an experience of the radical 
contextuality and heterogeneity of presence, of the fact that any humanly 
accessible intelligibility is only the focal point of a singular meaningful 
experience, a focal point of attention that is irreducibly determined and 
constituted by a transcending context or horizon of meaning that is not 
itself immediately present or accessible as such but remains in the 
background, in the margin.65 This context-specificity is what Heidegger’s 
 30 
work basically attempts to convey in ever-changing forms, starting with the 
fundamental ontological project of Being and Time which tried to articulate, 
by way of the temporality of Dasein’s understanding of being, how the 
meaningful temporal present (Gegenwart) is contextually constituted or 
“temporalized” in terms of the relative non-presence of the temporal 
dimensions of open future possibilities (the forth-coming, Zukunft) and 
factical situatedness (having-been-ness, Gewesenheit).66 Heidegger failed, 
however, to complete the intended ultimate move from this temporal 
contextuality of Dasein’s understanding of being (Dasein’s timeliness, 
Zeitlichkeit) to the correlative temporal contextuality of being itself (its 
temporality, Temporalität), i.e., the sense of being (Sinn von Sein).67 The 
conceptual impasse and consequent failure of this approach led Heidegger 
to undertake a new, deepened reading of the metaphysical tradition in the 
early 1930s.  
In the most developed version of his approach, Heidegger addressed 
the contextualizing interaction between the foreground of presence and the 
background of non-presence as an event, as “taking-place” (Ereignis). 
Whereas metaphysics thinks of presence as an absolutely self-contained 
and self-sufficient state, an event entails a difference between the open 
place or scene in which meaningfulness takes place—the Da, the “there,” of 
Da-sein as “being-the-there”—and the latent background context from out 
of which it “takes place,” that is, in terms of which it is constituted. This 
background is articulated in Heidegger’s 1949 Bremen lecture “The Thing” 
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with the help of the figure of the fourfold (Geviert) of four dimensions, 
named “earth,” “sky,” (“world”), “mortals,” and “divinities,” which can be 
tentatively interpreted as standing for the meaning-dimensions of 
materiality, articulated appearing and visibility, the finite and historically 
situated human community, and the supreme aims or “values” of such 
communities.68 In this articulation, a spatiotemporally situated thing is 
meaningful as a focal point of a nexus of references to this four-
dimensional context. The context is not static or stable but a dynamic 
process of contextualization, a “mirror-play” (Spiegel-Spiel) of reciprocal 
references in which the four meaning-dimensions constantly interact and 
are indirectly present as reflections, traces, or references in their focal 
intersection, i.e., in the contextualized thing.69 Since a thing is thus 
constantly being recontextualized, it follows that it must be understood, in 
each instant of its presence, as a strictly speaking singular instance of 
presence: “Each thing arrests the fourfold into a simplicity of the world 
that, in each instance, is there for a while [je Weiliges]. [. . .] Only what is 
compliantly conjoined [gering] from [the fourfold] world becomes a thing 
once.”70 Being (be-ing, Seyn) is no longer thought as something instantiated 
in singular instances, but as this instantiation and singularization as such. 
This instantaneity or singularity (Einzigkeit, Einmaligkeit) of being is what 
both the temporal approach of Being and Time and the later Heidegger’s 
fourfold approach seek to convey. Among the postmetaphysical decisions 
listed in Contributions, we find the following: 
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[. . .] whether beings [das Seiende] take being [Sein] as what is “most 
common” to them [sc. as in the metaphysical tradition since 
Parmenides] and thus hand being over to ontology and bury it, or 
whether be-ing [Seyn] in its uniqueness [Einzigkeit] comes to word 
and thoroughly attunes beings as singular [Einmaliges; sc. as in the 
other onset] [. . .].71  
 
The Parmenidean experience of being as pure accessibility and intelligible 
presence, as the absolute evidence (alētheia) that is de-cided, ab-solved 
from any background or context, grounded the unity of being in its 
universality: intelligibility as such is precisely what is common to all 
instances of intelligible presence and, as such, it is absolutely 
homogeneous and undifferentiated. By virtue of this “indifference,” being is 
also absolutely inarticulate, indeterminate, and indefinable. But what 
happens to this unity when being is rethought postmetaphysically as the 
radical contextualization of beings and as their differentiation from a 
context, as the generation of an intelligibility that is, in each instance, 
radically singular and heterogeneous? This is extensively elaborated by 
Heidegger in a key passage of the final part of Contributions: 
 
That Greek interpretation of on hē on [sc. being qua being] as hen 
[one], that heretofore unclear priority which the One and unity have 
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everywhere in the thinking of being [. . .]. Seen more profoundly, that 
unity is merely the foreground—seen from the vantage point of 
gathering re-presentation [sammelnden Vor-stellens] (legein)—of 
presencing [Anwesung] as such, precisely the foreground in which a 
being has already gathered itself in its “what” and “that.” Presence 
can be conceived of as gathering [Sammlung] and thus as unity—and 
with the priority of logos must be so conceived. But by itself, unity 
itself is not an originary and essential determination of the being of 
beings. However, the thinkers of the onset necessarily come upon 
this unity, because [. . .] it is important that presencing be 
maintained as what is first and nearest to being’s emergence; hence 
hen [. . .]. 
In terms of the other onset, that unshaken and never inquired 
determination of being (unity) can and must nevertheless become 
questionable; and then unity points back to “time” [. . .]. But then it 
becomes clear that with the priority of presence (the present 
[Gegenwart]) wherein unity is grounded, something has been decided, 
that in this most self-evident [priority] the strangest decision 
[Entscheidung] lies hidden, that this decisive character belongs to the 
abidance [Wesung] of be-ing and indicates the uniqueness, in each 
instance, and the most originary historicity of be-ing itself.72 
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As Aristotle already clearly realized, the unity of being is not the most 
fundamental thesis of Parmenides; it is based on a more fundamental 
thesis, “the strangest decision,” namely, that being is and that non-being is 
not.73 As a retrospective experience of this initial crisis or decision, the 
Heideggerian other onset addresses presence as irreducibly contextual and 
relative, as embedded and situated in a nexus of background dimensions in 
terms of which the foreground of presence becomes singularly meaningful 
as a heterogeneous unity, as a “onefold of four.”74  
The first, protometaphysical onset of philosophy says: “There is 
presence and there is no non-presence. The crisis of presence is therefore 
always already resolved and the unity of being is safeguarded as the pure 
homogeneity of presence, de-cided from its other.” Against this, the other, 
postmetaphysical onset would say: “There is presence only in terms of 
relative non-presence; the unity of presence is always situated, context-
specific, singular, and utterly heterogeneous. The crisis of presence, its 
differentiation from non-presence, cannot be overcome, since it is 
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